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Algorithmic Game Theory: 17th International Symposium, SAGT 2024, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, September 36, 2024, Proceedings [Paperback]

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  • Category: Books (Computers)
  • ISBN-10:  3031710320
  • ISBN-10:  3031710320
  • ISBN-13:  9783031710322
  • ISBN-13:  9783031710322
  • Publisher:  Springer
  • Publisher:  Springer
  • Binding:  Paperback
  • Binding:  Paperback
  • SKU:  3031710320-11-SPRI
  • SKU:  3031710320-11-SPRI
  • Pages:  546
  • Pages:  546
  • Item ID: 106791949
  • List Price: $89.99
  • Seller: ShopSpell
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This volume constitutes the refereed proceedings of 17th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2024, held in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, during September 36, 2024.

The 29 full papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 84 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: matching; fair division and resource allocation; mechanism design; game theory and repeated games; pricing, revenue, and regulation; matroid theory in game theory; information sharing and decision making; computational complexity and resource allocation.

.- The Computational Complexity of the Housing Market.

.- Ex-post Stability under Two-Sided Matching: Complexity and Characterization.

.- Approval-Based Committee Voting under Uncertainty.

.- Matching.

.- Structural and Algorithmic Results for Stable Cycles and Partitions in the Roommates Problem.

.- Online Matching with High Probability.

.- The Team Order Problem: Maximizing the Probability of Matching Being Large Enough.

.- Fair Division and Resource Allocation.

.- Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints.

.- Fair Division with Interdependent Values.

.- Fair Division with Bounded Sharing: Binary and Non-Degenerate Valuations.

.- Incentives in Dominant Resource Fair Allocation under Dynamic Demands.

.- Mechanism Design.

.- Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Location Games.

.- The k-Facility Location Problem Via Optimal Transport: A Bayesian Study of the Percentile MechalCx

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