This book argues that voters' willingness to hold lawmakers accountable produces insights into legislative organization, behavior and output.For many, Congress is an institution consumed by partisan bickering and gridlock. Yet the institution's long history of addressing significant societal problems even in recent years seems to contradict this view. The authors of this book argue that the willingness of many voters to hold elected officials accountable for societal conditions is central to appreciating why Congress responds to problems in society despite the many reasons mustered for why it cannot. The authors show that, across decades of policy making, problem-solving motivations explain why bipartisanship is a common pattern of congressional behavior and offer the best explanation for legislative issue attention and policy change.For many, Congress is an institution consumed by partisan bickering and gridlock. Yet the institution's long history of addressing significant societal problems even in recent years seems to contradict this view. The authors of this book argue that the willingness of many voters to hold elected officials accountable for societal conditions is central to appreciating why Congress responds to problems in society despite the many reasons mustered for why it cannot. The authors show that, across decades of policy making, problem-solving motivations explain why bipartisanship is a common pattern of congressional behavior and offer the best explanation for legislative issue attention and policy change.Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving shows how a simple premise voters are willing to hold lawmakers accountable for their collective problem-solving abilities can produce novel insights into legislative organization, behavior, and output. How do issues end up on the agenda? Why do lawmakers routinely invest in program oversight and broad policy development? What considerations drive legislative policy change? Knowing that thlóg