Crafting Consensusoffers a new theory of committee decision making and provides a rich understanding of modern-day central banking by studying central banks' communication with the public. Using extensive empirical analysis, Nicole Baerg explains how central bank transparency depends on the configuration of central bank committee members' preferences and the institutional rules governing how committee members set policy. The book shows that monetary policy committees comprised of bankers with opposing inflation preferences communicate more precisely and that precise communication then has positive economic effects.In a world dependent on the constant sharing of information, central bankers increasingly communicate their policies to the mass public. Central bank communications are drafted in monetary policy committee meetings composed of policymakers with differing interests. Despite their differences, committee members must come together, write, and agree to an official policy statement. Once released to the public, central bank communications then affect citizens' actions and ultimately, the economy. But how exactly does this work?InCrafting Consensus, Nicole Baerg explains how the transparency of central bank communication depends on the configuration of committee members' preferences. Baerg argues that monetary policy committees composed of members with differing preferences over inflation are better suited to communicating precise information with the public. These diverse committees produce central bank statements of higher quality and less uncertainty than those from more homogeneous committees. Additionally, she argues that higher quality statements more effectively shape individuals' inflation expectations and move the economy in ways that policymakers intend. Baerg demonstrates that central bankers are not impartial technocrats and that their preferences and the institutional rules where they work matter for understanding the politics of ml£&