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Designing Federalism A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions [Paperback]

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  • Category: Books (Political Science)
  • Author:  Filippov, Mikhail, Ordeshook, Peter C., Shvetsova, Olga
  • Author:  Filippov, Mikhail, Ordeshook, Peter C., Shvetsova, Olga
  • ISBN-10:  0521016487
  • ISBN-10:  0521016487
  • ISBN-13:  9780521016483
  • ISBN-13:  9780521016483
  • Publisher:  Cambridge University Press
  • Publisher:  Cambridge University Press
  • Pages:  398
  • Pages:  398
  • Binding:  Paperback
  • Binding:  Paperback
  • Pub Date:  01-May-2004
  • Pub Date:  01-May-2004
  • SKU:  0521016487-11-MPOD
  • SKU:  0521016487-11-MPOD
  • Item ID: 101396764
  • Seller: ShopSpell
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This book argues that a number of institutional variables can be critical in determining federal success.The design of federal states from Russia and the Ukraine to Canada and the European Union typically proceeds from a false set of assumptions regarding the institutional building blocks of such a state. Here the authors argue that rather than any carefully delineated allocation of policy juridictions, a number of institutional variables not normally associated with federal design (the content of regional charters and the extent to which public offices are filled by election rather than appointment) can be critical to determining federal success.The design of federal states from Russia and the Ukraine to Canada and the European Union typically proceeds from a false set of assumptions regarding the institutional building blocks of such a state. Here the authors argue that rather than any carefully delineated allocation of policy juridictions, a number of institutional variables not normally associated with federal design (the content of regional charters and the extent to which public offices are filled by election rather than appointment) can be critical to determining federal success.The design of federal states from Russia and the Ukraine to Canada and the European Union typically develops from a false set of assumptions regarding the institutional building blocks of such a state. Rather than any carefully delineated allocation of policy jurisdictions, the authors argue that a number of institutional variables, not normally associated with federal design, can be critical in determining federal success. (The variables are the content of regional charters and the extent to which public offices are filled by election rather than appointment.)1. Federations and the theoretical problem: 1.1 Why Federalism; 1.2 Definitions; 1.3 The long search for stability; Federalism as nuisance; Federalism as engine of prosperity; Riker as intermediary; 1.4 The fundamental problem lC&
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