Epistemic injustice refers to the injustice that a person suffers specifically in their capacity as a knower -- i.e., as someone who produces, conveys, or uses knowledge. Epistemic injustice occurs when members of non-dominant groups are not included or taken seriously in conversations or social representations due to individual or societal biases. Amandine Catala turns to important social questions and lived experience to provide a novel account of the dynamics of epistemic injustice: i.e., the many forms epistemic injustice can take, the different sites and mechanisms through which it operates, and the various transformations required for greater epistemic justice.Epistemic injustice refers to the injustice that a person suffers specifically in their capacity as a knower--i.e., as someone who produces, conveys, or uses knowledge. Epistemic injustice occurs every day when members of non-dominant groups are not included or taken seriously in conversations or social representations due to individual or societal biases.Epistemic injustice is inherently connected to epistemic power and epistemic agency: understanding and addressing epistemic injustice allows us to better understand and address epistemic power and agency, and vice versa. Yet, despite vast and rich discussions of epistemic injustice, which often invoke the notions of epistemic power and epistemic agency, both notions remain undertheorized and hence largely elusive. Amandine Catala offers a systematic account of epistemic power and agency by turning to the dynamics of epistemic injustice -- that is, the many forms epistemic injustice can take, the different sites and mechanisms through which it operates, and the various transformations consequently required to cultivate greater epistemic justice.Adopting standpoint theory as both a theoretical and a methodological framework, Catala considers several pressing social questions, such as deliberative impasses in divided societies, colonial memory, academic mils(