This book raises and addresses questions about the consequences of democratic institutions for economic performance.Drawing on concrete and observable experience in the U.S., with occasional reference to other countries, this accessible synthesis of extensive material suggests that there are modest and bearable costs of democratic procedures, comparable to the agency costs incurred whenever a principal delegates authority to an agent.Drawing on concrete and observable experience in the U.S., with occasional reference to other countries, this accessible synthesis of extensive material suggests that there are modest and bearable costs of democratic procedures, comparable to the agency costs incurred whenever a principal delegates authority to an agent.An accessible synthesis of a large body of material, Economic Politics raises and addresses questions about the consequences of democratic institutions for economic performance. Drawing on concrete and observable experience in the United States, with occasional reference to other countries, William Keech suggests that there are modest and bearable costs of democratic procedures, comparable to the agency costs incurred whenever a principal delegates authority to an agent. Democracy, according to Keech, does not systematically cause inferior macroeconomic policy detrimental to a population's long-term welfare. Rather, there is a logical circularity among voter preferences, institutions, and economic and political outcomes.Part I. Introduction: 1. Macroeconomic politics and the costs of democracy; 2. Macroeconomic theories and their political implications; Part II. Models of Routine Politics: 3. Models of accountability and opportunism: the electoral cycle; 4. Models of choice: partisanship; Part III. The Sources and Authority of Macroeconomic Goals: 5. The authority of macroeconomic goals; 6. Voters, elections, accountability, and choice; Part IV. Institutions and Processes: 7. Discretion and accountability in the fiscal pl£