To a large extent, elite politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen hold the fortunes of their societies in their hands. This edited volume describes how formal and informal institutions affect elite behaviour, which in turn affects corruption and the quality of government.List of illustrations Abbreviations Preface PART I: INTRODUCTION 1. How institutions constrain elites from destructive behavior; Carl Dahlstr?m and Lena W?ngnerud 2. Good Societies Need Good Leaders on a Leash; S?ren Holmberg and Bo Rothstein 3. Are Corrupt Elites Necessary for Corrupt Countries?; Susan Rose-Ackerman 4. Prestige, Immunity and Diplomats: Understanding Sexual Corruption; Ann Towns PART II: HISTORY AND STATE-BUILDING 5. The Political and Historical Origins of Good Government: How Social Contracts Shape Elite Behavior; Anna Persson and Martin Sj?stedt 6. Political Leadership and Quality of Government: Restraining Elites at Nascent Statehood; Ulrika M?ller and Isabell Schierenbeck 7. Rulers and their Elite Rivals: How Democratization has Increased Incentives for Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa; Michelle D'Arcy 8. Stability and Stagnation; Anders Sundell PART III: POWER-SHARING 9. Democratic and Professional Accountability; Carl Dahlstr?m and Victor Lapuente 10. Property Rights without Democracy: The Role of Elites' Rotation and Asset Ownership; Leonid Polishchuk and Georgiy Syunyaev 11. Dynamic Economic Growth as a Constraint on Elite Behavior; Petrus Olander 12. Political Control of Bureaucracies as an Incentive for Party Behavior; Agnes Cornell and Marcia Grimes PART IV: POLITICAL PARTIES 13. Political Parties and the Politics of The Quality Of Government; Philip Keefer 14. Why Women In Encompassing Welfare States Punish Corrupt Political Parties; Helena Stens?ta, Lena W?ngnerud and Mattias Agerberg