Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion [Hardcover]

Epistemic norms play an increasingly important role in current debates in epistemology and beyond. In this volume a team of established and emerging scholars presents new work on the key debates. They consider what epistemic requirements constrain appropriate belief, assertion, and action, and explore the interconnections between these standards.Epistemic norms play an increasingly important role in many current debates in epistemology and beyond. Paramount among these are debates about belief, action, and assertion. Three primary questions organize the literature. What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate belief? What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate assertion? What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate action? With the tremendous but disparate growth of the literature on epistemic norms, the time is ripe for a volume bringing together papers by established and emerging figures, with an eye toward the interconnections among our three questions. That is precisely what this volume seeks to do.Introduction,Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri1. Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm,Berit Brogaard2. Lenient Accounts of Warranted Assertability,E. J. Coffman3. Having False Reasons,Juan Comesana and Matthew McGrath4. On Knowing One's Reason,Jonathan Dancy5. Knowledge versus Truth,John Gibbons6. Epistemic Normativity,Jonathan L. Kvanvig7. The Unity of Reason,Clayton Littlejohn8. Epistemic Luck, Safety, and Assertion,Duncan Pritchard9. Epistemic Agency and Judgment,Ernest Sosa10. You Gotta Believe,John Turri11. The Spectra of Epistemic Norms,Matt Weiner12. Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action,Daniel Whiting13. The Dual-Aspect Norms of Belief and Assertion: A Virtue Approach to Epistemic Norms,Sarah WrightIndexClayton Littlejohnis Lecturer in phill“