Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions [Paperback]

This monograph focuses on exploring game theoretic modeling and mechanism design for problem solving in Internet and network economics. For the first time, the main theoretical issues and applications of mechanism design are bound together in a single text.

Introduction Motivating Problems in Network Economics Mechanism Design Outline of the MonographFoundations of Mechanism Design Strategic Form Games Dominant Strategy Equilibria Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Bayesian Games The Mechanism Design Environment Examples of Social Choice Functions Implementation of Social Choice Functions Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Theorem Properties of Social Choice Functions The Gibbard Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem Arrow's Impossibility Theorem The Quasi Linear Environment Groves Mechanisms Clarke (Pivotal) Mechanisms Examples of VCG Mechanisms Bayesian Implementation: The dAGVA Mechanism Bayesian Incentive Compatibility in Linear Environment Revenue Equivalence Theorem Myerson Optimal Auction Further Topics in Mechanism Design To Probe FurtherMechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions Internet Advertising Sponsored Search Auction Sponsored Search Auction as a Mechanism Design Problem Generalized First Price (GFP) Mechanism Generalized Second Price (GSP) Mechanism Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism Optimal (OPT) Mechanism Comparison of GSP, VCG, and OPT Mechanisms Individual Rationality Computational Complexity Summary and Future Work Related LiteratureMechanism Design for Resource Procurement in Grid Computing Grid Computing The Model The G-DSIC Mechanism The G-BIC Mechanism G-OPT: An Optimal Auction Mechanism Current Art and Future PerspectiveIncentive Compatible Broadcast Protocols for Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes Introduction to Ad hoc Wireless Networks Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes Relevant WorklÁ