Judicial Review in New Democracies Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases [Hardcover]

This book examines three countries in Asia to determine why new democracies adopt judicial review.New democracies around the world have adopted constitutional courts to oversee the operation of democratic politics. Where does judicial power come from, how does it develop, and what political conditions support its expansion? This book answers these questions through an examination of three constitutional courts in East Asia, where law is traditionally viewed as a tool of authoritarian rulers. Ginsburg argues that while judicial review does put constraints on government, it is sought as a solution to the problem of uncertainty in constitutional design. By providing insurance to prospective electoral losers, judicial review facilitates democracy.New democracies around the world have adopted constitutional courts to oversee the operation of democratic politics. Where does judicial power come from, how does it develop, and what political conditions support its expansion? This book answers these questions through an examination of three constitutional courts in East Asia, where law is traditionally viewed as a tool of authoritarian rulers. Ginsburg argues that while judicial review does put constraints on government, it is sought as a solution to the problem of uncertainty in constitutional design. By providing insurance to prospective electoral losers, judicial review facilitates democracy.Where does judicial power come from, how does it develop, and what political conditions support its expansion? This book answers these important questions through an examination of three constitutional courts in East Asia, where law is traditionally viewed as a tool of authoritarian rulers. New democracies around the world have adopted constitutional courts to oversee the operation of democratic politics. Thomas Ginsburg argues that, while judicial review does put constraints on government, it is sought as a solution to the problem of uncertainty in constitutional design. By provilCN