Among the various conceptions of truth is one according to which 'is true' is a transparent, entirely see-through device introduced for only practical (expressive) reasons. This device, when introduced into the language, brings about truth-theoretic paradoxes (particularly, the notorious Liar and Curry paradoxes). The options for dealing with the paradoxes while preserving the full transparency of 'true' are limited. InSpandrels of Truth, Beall concisely presents and defends a modest, so-called dialetheic theory of transparent truth.
1. The Basic Picture 2. Suitable Conditional 3. Just True 4. A Look at the Field 5. Objections and Replies 6. Appendix Overlap Without Inconsistency? References
Jc Beallis a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut, a member of the UConn Group in Logic, and an Associate Fellow of Arche, the AHRC Research Centre for the Philosophy of Logic, Language, Mathematics, and Epistemology. Though having wide philosophical interests, Beall has published mainly in philosophical logic and the philosophy of logic.
![Spandrels of Truth [Paperback]](/itemImage/2/2/2/1/2_1483828.jpg)