Unequivocal Justice challenges the prevailing view within political philosophy that broadly free market regimes are inconsistent with the basic principles of liberal egalitarian justice. Freiman argues that the liberal egalitarian rejection of free market regimes rests on a crucial methodological mistake. Liberal egalitarians regularly assume an ideal public interest model of political behavior and a nonideal private interest model of behavior in the market and civil society. Freiman argues that this asymmetrical application of behavioral assumptions biases the analysis and undercuts ideal theoretical treatments of every major liberal egalitarian principle, including political liberty, economic sufficiency, fair opportunity, and social equality. This book reexamines the institutional implications of each of these principles in nonideal conditions, making novel philosophical use of political psychology and public choice economics along the way.
Introduction
1. Ideal Institutional Theory
2. Is The State Special?
3. Political Liberty
4. Economic Sufficiency
5. Fair Opportunity
6. Social Equality
7. Libertarian Legitimacy
8. Behavioral Symmetry, Again
Conclusion
This book challenges the prevailing view within political philosophy that broadly free market regimes are inconsistent with the basic principles of liberal egalitarian justice.
In his engaging and provocative book, Christopher Freiman argues that Rawlsians often wrongly dismiss free market systems as vehicles for realizing justice & He poses an important methodological challenge for liberal political philosophies that move between ideal and nonideal theorizing. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews