Empty Ideas: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy [Paperback]

During the middle of the twentieth century, philosophers generally agreed that, by contrast with science, philosophy should offer no substantial thoughts about the general nature of concrete reality. Instead, philosophers offered conceptual truths. It is widely assumed that, since 1970, things have changed greatly. This book argues that's an illusion that prevails because of the failure to differentiate between concretely substantial and concretely empty ideas.Peter Unger's provocative new book poses a serious challenge to contemporary analytic philosophy, arguing that to its detriment it focuses the predominance of its energy on empty ideas. In the mid-twentieth century, philosophers generally agreed that, by contrast with science, philosophy should offer no substantial thoughts about the general nature of concrete reality. Leading philosophers were concerned with little more than the semantics of ordinary words. For example: Our word perceives differs from our word believes in that the first word is used more strictly than the second. While someone may be correct in saying Ibelievethere's a table before me whether or not there isa table before her, she will be correct in saying Iperceivethere's a table before me only if there isa table there. Though just a parochial idea, whether or not it is correct does make a difference to how things are with concrete reality. In Unger's terms, it is aconcretely substantial idea. Alongside each such parochial substantial idea, there is an analytic or conceptual thought, as with the thought that someone may believe there is a table before her whether or not there is one, but she will perceive there is a table before her only if there is a table there. Empty of import as to how things are with concrete reality, those thoughts are what Unger callsconcretely empty ideas.It is widely assumed that, since about 1970, things had changed thanks to the advent of such thoughlS›