Mathesis Universalis, Computability and Proof [Paperback]

In a fragment entitled Elementa Nova Matheseos Universalis (1683?) Leibniz writes the mathesis [&] shall deliver the method through which things that are conceivable can be exactly determined; in another fragment he takes the mathesis to be the science of all things that are conceivable. Leibniz considers all mathematical disciplines as branches of the mathesis and conceives the mathesis as a general science of forms applicable not only to magnitudes but to every object that exists in our imagination, i.e. that is possible at least in principle. As a general science of forms the mathesis investigates possible relations between arbitrary objects (objets quelconques). It is an abstract theory of combinations and relations among objects whatsoever.

In 1810 the mathematician and philosopher Bernard Bolzano published a booklet entitled Contributions to a Better-Grounded Presentation of Mathematics. There is, according to him, a certain objective connection among the truths that are germane to a certain homogeneous field of objects: some truths are the reasons (Gr?nde) of others, and the latter are consequences (Folgen) of the former. The reason-consequence relation seems to be the counterpart of causality at the level of a relation between true propositions. Arigorous proof is characterized in this context as a proof that shows the reason of the proposition that is to be proven. Requirements imposed on rigorous proofs seem to anticipate normalization results in current proof theory.

The contributors of Mathesisl3Ñ