The Geneva Agreements of 1954 were widely welcomed. They ended a seven-year war in Indochina; gave France a dignified exit; averted wider conflict. In later years first Americans and Vietnamese, then Russians, Chinese, Cambodians and even Laotians tried to force Indochina into different patterns of their own devising. These new wars triggered by rejection of the Geneva compromise lasted longer, killed more people, did greater damage and achieved less - for everybody. Perhaps Churchill was right: jaw-jaw is better than war-war. Certainly this lively, first-hand, up-dated account of the Geneva Conference of 1954 - that triumph of old-fashioned diplomacy, which Britain initiated and France completed - offers a better model for the twenty-first century to follow.List of Illustrations Preface to the 1999 Reprint Introduction French Attitudes and British Expectations Waiting upon Events Changing Course The Crisis of April Geneva: Tuning Up Prelude and Fugue Restricted Sessions: Restricted Results Phoenix from the Ashes France Takes the Lead Last Act Myths Epilogue Appendix 1: The Seven Points Appendix 2: The Final Declaration Notes and Bibliography Select Bibliography Index
'Specialists will welcome the reprinting, after fourteen years, of what is probably Sir James Cable's most important book. For, surprisingly, it remains the only work that primarily focuses on the British role in defusing the Indo-China Crisis of 1954...a valuable book which it is good to see available again.' - David Carlton, Times Literary Supplement
'The British delegation included the young James Cable...an engaging writer and a shrewd observer of how personalities affect what goes on round conference tables (and, often more important, in the corridors outside).' - Morrison Halcrow, Daily Telegraph
'Sir James Cable's ...ability to provide a lucid and engrossing account of a dramatic performance that was always taking place on a revolving stage has producel³…