Building Business in Post-Communist Russia, Eastern Europe, and Eurasia: Collective Goods, Selective Incentives, and Predatory States [Paperback]

Duvanova examines the development of business interest representation in the postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia.Prior to 1989, the communist countries of Eastern Europe and the USSR lacked genuine employer and industry associations. After the collapse of communism, industry associations mushroomed throughout the region. This book examines why some businesses in some countries join these groups while others do not. The answer lies at the intersection of a firm's experiences with economic regulations, corrupt enforcement practices, and the ability of business interest organizations to provide effective regulatory relief to their members and the larger business community. The book's findings make us rethink long-standing theories of interest group politics.Prior to 1989, the communist countries of Eastern Europe and the USSR lacked genuine employer and industry associations. After the collapse of communism, industry associations mushroomed throughout the region. This book examines why some businesses in some countries join these groups while others do not. The answer lies at the intersection of a firm's experiences with economic regulations, corrupt enforcement practices, and the ability of business interest organizations to provide effective regulatory relief to their members and the larger business community. The book's findings make us rethink long-standing theories of interest group politics.This book examines the development of business interest representation in the postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia. The central argument is that abusive regulatory regimes discourage the formation of business associations. At the same time, poor regulatory enforcement tends to encourage associational membership growth. Academic research often treats special interest groups as vehicles of protectionism and non-productive collusion. This book challenges this perspective with evidence of market-friendly activities of industry associations as wellCÄ