Self-Knowing Agents [Paperback]

Lucy O'Brien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. Clearly written, with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone working in the philosophy of mind and action.Lucy O'Brien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. She considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions? Clearly written, with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone working in the philosophy of mind and action.PrefacePart I.1. Introduction2. Arguments for the No-Reference View of 'I'3. Perceptual Models of First Person Reference4. The Self-Reference Rule5. The Agency Account6. Agent's Awareness and Knowledge of Our Mental ActionsPart II7. Introduction8. What are Actions?9. On Knowing One's Own Physical Actions10. Bodily Awareness11. Bodily Awareness and Self-KnowledgeLucy O'Brienis a Reader in Philosophy at University College LondonClearly written, with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone working in the philosophy of mind and action.