Spinozas Argument for Substance Monism: Why There Is Only One Thing [Hardcover]

InSpinozas Argument for Substance Monism: Why There Is Only One Thing, Christopher Martin provides an interpretation and defense of this argument, using speculative metaphysics as a method to show how the key terms and concepts are employed and fit together. Specifically, Martin argues that (i) Spinozas understanding of substance and attribute departs only slightly from dominant historic notions; (ii) his definition of God in terms of attributes instead of perfections is quite helpful and (mostly) compatible with more traditional definitions; and (iii) Spinozas pairing of causal and conceptual relations is more intuitive than we think. Martin also shows how these essences function as causes and explains why, with Spinozas understanding of emanation and conceptual independence, any substance must have every attribute. These features of Spinozas argument explain and defend his ultimate claim that God/Nature is the only substantial being in existence. This book demonstrates how approachable and compelling Spinozas argument is and illustrates the practice and potential of speculative metaphysics for specialists and non-specialists alike.Christopher Martinis associate professor of philosophy at the University of Toledo.

In this slim monograph Martin tackles a difficult question confronting the reader of Baruch Spinozas masterworkEthics: why must God be the only substance, and all other things (including oneself) merely modes or properties of God? Martin helpfully summarizes some longstanding debates in the analytic philosophical scholarship surrounding this question, including the subjective and objective interpretations of the attributes of substance, and whether Spinoza might conceive of modes as properties or quasi-substances. Martin develops an interpretation in which substance emanates modesproducing and sustaining them without altering or diminishing its own being. Modes should be understood as modifications of an underlying field,lÃ(