For the last 100 years historians have denigrated the psychology of the
Critique of Pure Reason. In opposition, Patricia Kitcher argues that we can only understand the deduction of the categories in terms of Kant's attempt to fathom the
psychologicalprerequisites of thought, and that this investigation illuminates thinking itself. Kant tried to understand the task environment of knowledge and thought: Given the data we acquire and the scientific generalizations we make, what basic cognitive capacities are necessary to perform these feats? What do these capacities imply about the inevitable structure of our knowledge? Kitcher specifically considers Kant's claims about the unity of the thinking self; the spatial forms of human perceptions; the relations among mental states necessary for them to have content; the relations between perceptions and judgment; the malleability essential to empirical concepts; the structure of empirical concepts required for inductive inference; and the limits of philosophical insight into psychological processes.
An excellent work, a must for everyone who is grappling with Kant's theory of empirical knowledge....A rich book. --
Philosophical Review Kitcher's provocative study provides a valuable counterpoint to Richard E. Aquila's....Highly recommended. --
Choice It seems very likely that [this book] will set the agenda for interpretations of Kant over the next few years. --
Review of Metaphysics [This book] represents a bold break with the anti-psychologism dominant in Kant critics....This eminently readable book draws on historical and contemporary debates in both philosophy and psychology in defending what she says are Kant's important insights regarding perception, synthesis and personal identity. --
Times Higher Education Supplement Perhaps the strongest feature of Kitcher's work, apart from its accessibility to modern readers who ală.