The Limits of Judicial Independence [Hardcover]

This book examines the relationship among the US Supreme Court, Congress, and the public.This book examines the relationship among the U.S. Supreme Court, Congress, and the public. Contrasting most studies of Court-Congress relations in the United States (which assume that the Court is primarily concerned with avoiding statutory reversals of its decisions), the book argues that the Courts primary concern is protecting its institutional legitimacy and securing compliance with its decisions. In addition to borrowing from recent research in comparative politics, the book uses a combination of interviews with Supreme Court justices, members of Congress, and Court and Congress staffers to develop a formal model of Court-Congress relations. The book uses an original dataset of Court-curbing bills from 1877 to assess why members of Congress introduce such legislation and how the Court reacts to the bills.This book examines the relationship among the U.S. Supreme Court, Congress, and the public. Contrasting most studies of Court-Congress relations in the United States (which assume that the Court is primarily concerned with avoiding statutory reversals of its decisions), the book argues that the Courts primary concern is protecting its institutional legitimacy and securing compliance with its decisions. In addition to borrowing from recent research in comparative politics, the book uses a combination of interviews with Supreme Court justices, members of Congress, and Court and Congress staffers to develop a formal model of Court-Congress relations. The book uses an original dataset of Court-curbing bills from 1877 to assess why members of Congress introduce such legislation and how the Court reacts to the bills.This book investigates the causes and consequences of congressional attacks on the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the extent of public support for judicial independence constitutes the practical limit of judicial independence. First, the book presents a historical#A