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Money and the Rule of Law: Generality and Predictability in Monetary Institutions [Hardcover]

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  • Category: Books (Business & Economics)
  • Author:  Boettke, Peter J., Salter, Alexander William, Smith, Daniel J.
  • Author:  Boettke, Peter J., Salter, Alexander William, Smith, Daniel J.
  • ISBN-10:  1108479847
  • ISBN-10:  1108479847
  • ISBN-13:  9781108479844
  • ISBN-13:  9781108479844
  • Publisher:  Cambridge University Press
  • Publisher:  Cambridge University Press
  • Pages:  256
  • Pages:  256
  • Binding:  Hardcover
  • Binding:  Hardcover
  • Pub Date:  01-Nov-2021
  • Pub Date:  01-Nov-2021
  • SKU:  1108479847-11-MPOD
  • SKU:  1108479847-11-MPOD
  • Item ID: 106269221
  • List Price: $99.99
  • Seller: ShopSpell
  • Ships in: 2 business days
  • Transit time: Up to 5 business days
  • Delivery by: Oct 12 to Oct 14
  • Notes: Brand New Item. Not shipped to AK, HI, APO, FPO, AE.
A novel argument that shows how rules work better than discretion when implementing monetary policy.Working at the intersection of monetary economics and political economy, the authors of this volume develop novel arguments for why discretionary central banking is hard to reconcile with liberal democracy and doesn't actually solve or prevent financial crises. For that, we need rules, not discretion.?Working at the intersection of monetary economics and political economy, the authors of this volume develop novel arguments for why discretionary central banking is hard to reconcile with liberal democracy and doesn't actually solve or prevent financial crises. For that, we need rules, not discretion.?Contemporary monetary institutions are flawed at a foundational level. The reigning paradigm in monetary policy holds up constrained discretion as the preferred operating framework for central banks. But no matter how smart or well-intentioned are central bankers, discretionary policy contains information and incentive problems that make macroeconomic stability systematically unlikely. Furthermore, central bank discretion implicitly violates the basic jurisprudential norms of liberal democracy. Drawing on a wide body of scholarship, this volume presents a novel argument in favor of embedding monetary institutions into a rule of law framework. The authors argue for general, predictable rules to provide a sturdier foundation for economic growth and prosperity. A rule of law approach to monetary policy would remedy the flaws that resulted in misguided monetary responses to the 2007-8 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. Understanding the case for true monetary rules is the first step toward creating more stable monetary institutions.Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Knowledge problems with discretionary monetary policy; 3. Incentive problems with discretionary central banking; 4. When firefighters are arsonists; 5. On the shoulders of giants: monetary policy insights of the lós
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