This book argues that these outcomes are linked to the ownership structure that petroleum-rich states choose to manage their wealth.The conventional wisdom is that petroleum-rich countries in the developing world are cursed: destined, because of their wealth, to suffer from poor economic performance, unbalanced growth, weak states, and authoritarian regimes. We argue instead that these outcomes are linked to the ownership structure that petroleum-rich states choose to manage their wealth. Ownership structure is the first and most important choice that petroleum-rich states make because it shapes incentives for subsequent institution building: in particular, fiscal regimes.The conventional wisdom is that petroleum-rich countries in the developing world are cursed: destined, because of their wealth, to suffer from poor economic performance, unbalanced growth, weak states, and authoritarian regimes. We argue instead that these outcomes are linked to the ownership structure that petroleum-rich states choose to manage their wealth. Ownership structure is the first and most important choice that petroleum-rich states make because it shapes incentives for subsequent institution building: in particular, fiscal regimes.This book makes two central claims: first, that mineral-rich states are cursed not by their wealth but, rather, by the ownership structure they chose to manage their mineral wealth and second, that weak institutions are not inevitable in mineral-rich states. Each represents a significant departure from the conventional resource curse literature, which has treated ownership structure as a constant across time and space and has presumed that mineral-rich countries are incapable of either building or sustaining strong institutions particularly fiscal regimes. The experience of the five petroleum-rich Soviet successor states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) provides a clear challenge to both of these assumptions. ThelăM