In
On Truth and the Representation of Reality, Dan Nesher develops a new theory of truth in the framework of pragmatist theory of representation. Using the pragmatist theory of perception for the basis of his epistemological explanation of our
confrontationwith external Reality and how it's represented, Nesher shows that in our perceptual operations we quasi-prove the
truthof our perceptual judgments. He explains how- through our proving the truth of our propositions and theories, we know that they correspond to Reality, and through our proving their falsity, we know that they don't correspond to it.
Dan Nesherteaches Philosophy at the University of Haifa, Israel, and was a Visiting Scholar at several universities including Harvard University, Indiana University at Bloomington, and University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He has written articles on Philosophy of Language, Theory of Knowledge and Theories of Meaning and Truth
Chapter 1 Foreword
Chapter 2 Introduction
Chapter 3 Spinoza's Theory of Truth
Chapter 4 Peircean Realism: Truth as Meaning of Cognitive Signs Representing External Reality
Chapter 5 Pragmatist Realism: The Third Philosophical Perspective as the Intermediate Point between Metaphysical Realism and Internal Realism
Chapter 6 Which Side Spinoza Would Have Taken [between Einstein and Bohr] if He had Lived to See the [Scientific] Development of Our Days (Bohr, 1949:237): An Analysis of Human Representation of Physical Reality
Chapter 7 The Pragmatist Conception of Truth with a Bold Solution to the Liar Paradox
Chapter 8 In Spite of Davidson's Arguments for The Folly of Trying to Define Truth, Truth Can be Defined
Chapter 9 We Know What Our Propositions Represent When We Prove Their Truth: Response to Gettier
Chapter 10 Putnam on Truth: Can We Know Reality with a Big R with Proved Truths with a Small t?
Chapter 11 Pragmatic Theory of Truth: Are Frege's and Ramsey's Equation p is trli