Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism: On Disbelieving Our Philosophical Views [Hardcover]

The ancient Pyrrhonian skeptics suspended judgment about all philosophical views. Their main opponents were the Dogmatiststhose who believed their preferred philosophical views. InOutlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism: On Disbelieving Our Philosophical Views, Mark Walker argues, contra Pyrrhonians and Dogmatists, for a darker skepticism: that we should disbelieve our philosophical views. On the question of political morality, for example, we should disbelieve libertarianism, conservativism, socialism, liberalism, and any alternative ideologies. Since most humans have philosophical beliefs, such as about religious and political matters, humanity writ large should disbelieve their preferred philosophical views. Walker argues that Skeptical-Dogmatism permits a more realistic estimation of our epistemic powers. Dogmatists who believe their view is correct, while believing that two or more competing views are false, mustat least implicitlytake themselves to be ?ber epistemic superiors to their disagreeing colleagues. Such a self-assessment is as implausible as it is hubristic. Skeptical-Dogmatism, in contrast, permits a more realistic and humbler epistemic self-conception. Walker also shows that there are no insuperable practical difficulties in living as a Skeptical-Dogmatist.Mark Walkeris professor in the philosophy department at New Mexico State University.

Recent times have seen an explosion of interest in the epistemic significance of disagreement. Drawing inspiration from Socrates and the ancient Pyrrhonists, Mark Walkers new book contributes to the current epistemological debate on how one should react to disagreement by proposing a novel and provocative answer: in many multi-proposition philosophical disputes, each view should be deemed probably false. Since not only philosophers but also most laypersons hold philosophical views that have multiple competitors, Walkers skeptical-dogmatism recommends a radical change in our attitude towards a lƒŽ