The book ascribes a central role to the existence of underlying microeconomic frictions and to redistributive pressures between rich and poor, and shows how these ingredients may give rise to labour market rents, which in turn explain why a coherent set of rigidities arise as the outcome of the political process.
Introduction Part I. The support for labour market regulations 1. The no-rent society 2. A less perfect world: market rents and redistributive conflict 3. Wage rigidity and social cohesion 4. Employment protection 5. Unemployment benefits and other measures for the unemployed 6. The constituency effect 7. The identifiability effect Part II. The political economy of labour market reform 8. Two-tier systems 9. Politico-economic complementarities
Gilles Saint-Paulis professor of economics at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain, and a research fellow of CEPR, London, and IZA, Bonn. He earned his Ph.D. at MIT and then worked as a researcher at CERAS and DELTA in Paris before moving to Barcelona. He has been a visiting professor at MIT, UCLA, and CEMFI in Madrid. He has served as a consultant for the IMF, the Spanish Ministry of Labour, the UK Treasury, and the Swedish Parliamentary Committee on labour market policy.
Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research since 1991
Council member of the European Economic Association, 1997-
Refereeing:American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, European Economic Review, Economic Journal, Economic Policy, International Economic Review, Journal of Public Economics, etc.http:ló,
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