Property Rights in Post-Soviet Russia: Violence, Corruption, and the Demand for Law [Hardcover]

This book looks at how top-down efforts to strengthen property rights are unlikely to succeed without demand for law from private firms.Rule of law depends not just on the state's creation of effective legal institutions, but also on firms' and individuals' willingness to use law - rather than violence or corruption - to resolve disputes. Yet as this book demonstrates in its scrutiny of post-Soviet Russia, the crucial importance of private sector 'demand' for law is often overlooked.Rule of law depends not just on the state's creation of effective legal institutions, but also on firms' and individuals' willingness to use law - rather than violence or corruption - to resolve disputes. Yet as this book demonstrates in its scrutiny of post-Soviet Russia, the crucial importance of private sector 'demand' for law is often overlooked.The effectiveness of property rights - and the rule of law more broadly - is often depicted as depending primarily on rulers' 'supply' of legal institutions. Yet the crucial importance of private sector 'demand' for law is frequently overlooked. This book develops a novel framework that unpacks the demand for law in Russia, building on an original enterprise survey as well as extensive interviews with lawyers, firms, and private security agencies. By tracing the evolution of firms' reliance on violence, corruption, and law over the two decades following the Soviet Union's collapse, the book clarifies why firms in various contexts may turn to law for property rights protection, even if legal institutions remain ineffective or corrupt. The author's detailed demand-side analysis of property rights draws attention to the extensive role that law plays in the Russian business world, contrary to frequent depictions of Russia as lawless.1. Violence, corruption, and demand for law; 2. Institutional supply and demand; 3. The evolution of firm strategies; 4. The role of state legal capacity; 5. Demand-side barriers to the use of legal strategies; 6. Thelƒ,