Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking.
- Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thought
- Includes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens in us
- Gives an account of what reasons are and argues that the connection between rationality and reasons is much less close than many philosophers have thought
- Contains rigorous new accounts of oughts including owned oughts, agent-relative reasons, the logic of requirements, instrumental rationality, the role of normativity in reasoning, following a rule, the correctness of reasoning, the connections between intentions and beliefs, and much else.
- Offers a new answer to the motivation question of how a normative belief motivates an action.
Preface xi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation 1
1.2 This book 4
Notes 6
2 Ought 8
2.1 The meaning of ought 8
2.2 Normative and non-normative oughts 9
2.3 Owned and unowned oughts 12
2.4 Qualified and unqualified oughts 25
Notes 29
3 Objective, Subjective and Prospective Oughts 31
3.1 Sidgwicks View 31
3.2 The need to decide 34
3.3 Objective and prospective oughts 36<lcB