As the U.S. Navy enters the twenty-first century, many of the ships, aircraft, weapons, and tactics it employed so successfully during the Cold War will no longer be cost-effective or even effective. Future battlefields will shift the locus of naval action from the high seas into littoral waters, demanding sustained operations in relatively narrow, shallow waters. Naval forces in the twenty-first century must not only meet the traditional requirements of command of the seaships, planes, troops, and basescarrying out forward presence, crisis response, strategic deterrence, and sealift. They must now put these together to obtain the four key operational capabilities of littoral warfare: command, control, intelligence and surveillance, and communication; battlespace dominance; power projection; and force sustainment. The core of the new U.S. strategic concept is
power projection, and it envisions naval forces directly leading Army and Air Force elements to influence events ashore, most probably in the Third World. And this navy must be cost effective.CHARLES W. KOBURGER, JR., is currently a consultant on maritime affairs. He has published extensively on naval and maritime subjects, including
Naval Expeditions: The French Return to Indochina, 1945-1946(forthcoming, 1997),
Pacific Turning Point: The Solomons Campaign, 1942-1943(1995),
Naval Warfare in the Baltic, 1939-1945: War in a Narrow Sea(1994),
Franco-American Naval Relations, 1940-1945(1993),
Naval Warfare in the Eastern Mediterranean: 1940-1945(1993), and
The French Navy in Indochina: Riverine and Coastal Forces, 1945-54(1991), all from Praeger.
Illustrations
Introduction
The Operational Environment Today and Tomorrow
Naval Expeditionary Forces
Surface Combatants
Maneuvering from the Sea
In Harm's Way
Signs of the Future
A Future Model
Inter-Service Cooperation
Summary and Conclusion
Appendixes
Bibliography
Index