Bertrand Russell's Bundle Theory of Particularspresents and evaluates Russell's arguments for two competing theories on the nature of particulars at different stages in his career: the substratum theory of particulars (1903-1913) and the bundle theory of particulars (1940-1948).
Through its original focus on Russell's little known metaphysics in the later part of his career, this study explains why Russell's theory of particulars is relevant today. It argues that a Russellian realist bundle theory is indeed the best explanation of similarities and differences that we observe around us thanks to the ontological economy such a theory provides and its strength and completeness as a theory of the nature of reality.
Tackling the major criticisms levelled against the realist bundle theory - the problem of individuation, the problem of necessity, and the problem of analyticity - this study presents and defends a tenable Russellian bundle theory which can answer the objections.Bertrand Russell's Bundle Theory of Particularsis a novel and significant contribution to Russell scholarship.
G?lberk Ko? Macleanis Contract Faculty at Mount Royal University, Canada. She writes on Metaphysics and Epistemology.
Preface
Acknowledgements
List of abbreviations
Introduction: Setting the metaphysical scene
Chapter 1 The substratum theory (19031940)
Chapter 2 The bundle theory (19401948)
Chapter 3 The epistemology of the bundles: non-demonstrative inference
Chapter 4 The problem of individuation
Chapter 5 The problem of necessity
Chapter 6 The problem of analyticity
Chapter 7 Neutral monism
Chapter 8 Logical atomism
Conclusion