Between Universalism and Skepticism Ethics as Social Artifact [Hardcover]

Philips defends a middle ground between the view that there is a set of standards binding on rational beings as such (universalism) and the view that differences in morals reduce ultimately to matters of taste (skepticism). He begins with a sustained critique of universalist moral theories and some familiar approaches to concrete moral questions that presuppose them (most appeals to intuitions, respect for person's moralities, and versions of contractarianism and wide reflective equilibrium). He goes on to criticize major recent attempts to develop nonuniversalist alternatives to skepticism, arguing that they rely on excessively abstract and philosophically indefensible preference satisfaction theories of the good. According to Philips's positive alternative, moral standards are justified to the extent that they support reasonably valued ways of life. He devotes considerable attention to clarifying this idea and draws conclusions from it about the role and limits of reason in ethics. Philips's theory provides us with a theoretical basis for dealing with actual moral controversies and for approaching questions of applied and professional ethics in a systematic way.

The book is clearly written, and the arguments are presented in a straightforward manner. There is something here for everyone at the college and university level. --Choice

An intelligent and carefully argued book that deserves the attention of theologians and religious ethicists, as well as moral philosophers. --Religious Studies Review

A balanced and thought-provoking book. the clarity and depth of the exposition and argument are impressive; it is well worth reading, especiallu by those who, like myself, are not likely convinced. --Ethics