British Policy in the Persian Gulf, 1961-1968 Conceptions of Informal Empire [Hardcover]

An in-depth analysis of Great Britain's policy in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region during the last years of British imperialism in the area, covering the period from the independence of Kuwait to the decision of the Wilson Government to withdraw from the Gulf.Acknowledgements Maps List of Abbreviations List of Photographs Introduction 1. Structural Foundations 2. The Kuwait Crisis and its Consequences 3. The Limits to Anglo-American Cooperation 4. Improving Britain's Image: the Modernisation Policy 5. Excluding the Arab League: The Development Policy 6. An Obstacle to Modernisation and Federation: Shaikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi 7. The Prospect of Great Britain's Withdrawal Conclusion Appendix Bibliography Index

When set against the broader backdrop of decolonization during the 1960s, it is tempting to paint a broad-brush picture of gradual and inevitable retreat. By contrast, Helene von Bismarck's study shows that for much of the decade the British government and its representatives on the ground in the Gulf did not contemplate such a retreat. She argues that in the wake of the substantial military deployment in defense of Kuwait in the summer of 1961, a British government review concluded that vital British economic

interests were at stake. - Nigel J. Ashton, The Middle East Journal, Volume 67, Number 4, Autumn 2013, pp.659-660 (Article)

If the defense of British economic interests was at the heart of the continuing British commitment to the Gulf through the mid-1960s, the question might reasonably be asked, defense against whom? Von Bismarck concludes rightly that the main threat to the British position was perceived as coming from Arab nationalism, whether in the form of the Iraqi threat to Kuwait, or, more generally in the form of the advance of the influence of Egyptian President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser. - Nigel J. Ashton, The Middle East Journal, Volume 67, Number 4, Autumn 2013, pp.659-660 (Article)