Case Studies in Contracting and Organization is an edited collection of empirical studies from the transaction-cost economics literature on contracting and organization. Derived from the work of Ronald Coase, 1991 winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, Olive Williamson, and other transaction-cost economists, the studies explore such fundamental organizational issues as the role of reputation, the purpose and limitations of contracts, the nature and boundaries of the firm, and the evolution and role of hybrid organizational forms such as franchising, leasing, and joint ventures. Industries covered include aerospace, automotive, electric power generation, fast food, natural gas, ocean shipping, petroleum, coke refining, rail transportation, soft drink distribution, shoe manufacturing, and tuna processing. An introductory chapter provides an overview of transaction-cost reasoning and a summary of each study's contributions to our understanding of the problem of economic organization. The relatively nontechnical nature of the readings makes the book accessible to business and law students as well as advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics.
1. Introduction Part I. Contracting 2. A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry,Robert C. Ellickson 3. Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting,Thomas M. Palay 4. Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke,Victor P. Goldberg and John P. Erickson 5. Efficient Adaptation in Long-Term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas,Scott E. Masten and Keith J. Crocker 6. Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets,Paui L. Joskow 7. Contracting Practices in Bulk Shipping Markets: A Transaction Cost Explanation,Stephen Craig Pirrong Part II. Vertl#,