Competition Policy A Game-Theoretic Perspective [Paperback]

This entirely up-to-date book uses the latest game theory to analyse anti-competitive behaviour among firms and to consider its implications for competition policy.Using game theory to analyze anti-competitive behavior among firms, this text also considers the implications for competition policy. It discusses several European antitrust decisions and empirical studies in detail.Using game theory to analyze anti-competitive behavior among firms, this text also considers the implications for competition policy. It discusses several European antitrust decisions and empirical studies in detail.This book uses game theory to analyze anti-competitive behavior among firms and to consider its implications for competition policy. Topics include explicit collusion, tacit collusion, semicollusion, and the detection of predatory pricing. The book discusses several European antitrust decisions and empirical studies in detail.Preface; Acknowledgements; 1. Preliminaries; Part I. Explicit Collusion: 2. Four are few and six are many; 3. Cartel laws are good for business; 4. Cartel enforcement; Part II. Tacit Collusion: 5. Information sharing among oligopolists; 6. Repeated games with collusive outcomes; 7. Price leadership and conscious parallelism; 8. Collusion detection; Part III. Semicollusion: 9. Excess capacity and collusion; 10. Collusion in R & D; Part IV. Predatory Pricing: 11. Predation in theory; 12. Evidence on predation; 13. Antitrust implications.