1. Introduction.- Architecture and Properties l.- A Copernican Revolution.- Distributed Representations and Context Dependence.- The Nature of Thought.- 2. Action, Connectionism and Enaction: A Developmental Perspective.- Background.- Symbols, Connectionism and Innate Knowledge.- System Scale and the Control of Action.- Development, Emergence and Enaction.- Conclusion.- 3. Connectionism and Why Fodor and Pylyshyn Are Wrong.- The Case Against Connectionism.- Fodor and Pylyshyns Four Conditions.- Systems that Satisfy these Conditions.- Fodor and Pylyshyns Argument.- Whats Wrong with this Argument.- Whats Wrong with Premise (T3)?.- Whats Wrong with Premise (T2)?.- Whats Wrong with Premise (T1).- Whats Wrong with this Defence?.- The Turing Machine Paradigm.- Minds as Semiotic Systems.- Cognitive Architecture.- On Behalf of Neural Networks.- Dispositions and Predispositions.- The Proper Comparison.- 4. Connectionism, Classical Cognitive Science and Experimental Psychology.- Classicism Versus Connectionism.- The Psychological Data.- Memory.- Inference.- Theory.- Memory.- Inference.- Modelling.- Memory.- Inference.- Conclusions.- 5. Connecting Object to Symbol in Modelling Cognition.- Symbol Systems.- The Symbolic Theory of Mind.- The Symbol Grounding Problem.- Neural Nets.- Transducers and Analogue Transformations.- Robotic Capacities: Discrimination and Identification.- Philosophical Objections to Bottom-Up Grounding of Concrete and Abstract Categories.- Categorical Perception and Category-Learning.- Neural Net and CP.- Analogue Constraints on Symbols.- 6 Active Symbols and Internal Models: Towards a Cognitive Connectionism.- Criticisms of Connectionism.- Connectionism Equals Behaviourism.- Are FFPA Models Behaviourist?.- Connectionism Equals Associationism.- The Active Symbol.- Active Symbols and Control Mechanisms.- Symbol Formation and Properties.- Higher-Level Processes.- First-Order Knowledge Structures.- Second-Order Knowledge Structures.- Toward Structure-Sl3Ä