Controlling Institutions International Organizations and the Global Economy [Paperback]

This book argues that informal state power explains the institutional design, performance shortcomings and legitimacy problems in international organizations.Politics in international organizations does not follow formal rules. Through studies of the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization and the European Union, Randall W. Stone shows how informal power explains variations in institutional design, performance and legitimacy, and explains how international organizations really function.Politics in international organizations does not follow formal rules. Through studies of the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization and the European Union, Randall W. Stone shows how informal power explains variations in institutional design, performance and legitimacy, and explains how international organizations really function.How is the United States able to control the IMF with only 17% of the votes? How are the rules of the global economy made? This book shows how a combination of formal and informal rules explain how international organizations really work. Randall W. Stone argues that formal rules apply in ordinary times, while informal power allows leading states to exert control when the stakes are high. International organizations are therefore best understood as equilibrium outcomes that balance the power and interests of the leading state and the member countries. Presenting a new model of institutional design and comparing the IMF, WTO and EU, Stone argues that institutional variations reflect the distribution of power and interests. He shows that US interests influence the size, terms and enforcement of IMF programs, and new data, archival documents and interviews reveal the shortcomings of IMF programs in Mexico, Russia, Korea, Indonesia and Argentina.1. Introduction: international organization and US power; Part I. Theory: 2. A theory of international organization; 3. A model of informal governance; Part II. Cases: 4. Informal govel­