Over the last two decades, debates over the viability of commonsense psychology have been center stage in both cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. Eliminativists have argued that advances in cognitive science and neuroscience will ultimately justify a rejection of our folk theory of the mind, and of its ontology. In the first half of this book Stich, who was at one time a leading advocate of eliminativism, maintains that even if the sciences develop in the ways that eliminativists foresee, none of the arguments for ontological elimination are tenable. Rather than being resolved by science, he contends, these ontological disputes will be settled by a pragmatic process in which social and political considerations have a major role to play. In later chapters, Stich argues that the widespread worry about naturalizing psychological properties is deeply confused, since there is no plausible account of what naturalizing requires on which the failure of the naturalization project would lead to eliminativism. He also offers a detailed analysis of the many different notions of folk psychology to be found in philosophy and psychology, and argues that simulation theory, which purports to be an alternative to folk psychology, is not supported by recent experimental findings.
1. Deconstructing the Mind
2. Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology,
with William Ramsey and Joseph Garon3. What
IsFold Psychology?,
with Ian Ravenscroft4. How Do Minds Understand Minds? Mental Simulation versus Tacit Theory,
with Shaun Nichols5. Intentionality and Naturalism,
with Stephen Laurence6. Naturalism, Positivism, and Pluralism
References
Index
Stich's argument, presented in the first chapter, will surely become a classic essay in the study of mind....Surely ought not to be missed. --
Choice Deconstructing the Mindpromises to be one of the most fascinalc7