Deflationism and Paradox [Paperback]

Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists, which their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of interest to philosophers of logic, philosophers of language, and anyone working on truth.

Introduction
1. Transparent disquotationalism,JC Beall
2. Is the Liar sentence both true and false?,Hartry Field
3. Spiking the field artillery,Graham Priest
4. Variations on a theme by Yablo,Hartry Field
5. A minimalist critique of Tarski on truth,Paul Horwich
6. Minimalism, epistemicism, and paradox,Bradley Armour-Garb and JC Beall
7. Minimalists about truth can (and should) be epistemicists, and it helps if they are revision theorists too,Greg Restall
8. Minimalism, deflationism, and paradoxes,Michael Glanzberg
9. Do the paradoxes pose a special problem for deflationism?,Anil Gupta
10. Semantics for deflationists,Christopher Gauker
11. How significant is the Liar?,Dorothy Grover
12. The deflationists' axioms for truth,Volker Halbach and Leon Horsten
13. Naive truth and sophisticated logic,Alan Weir
14. Anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers and paradoxes,Jody Azzouni

J. C. Beallis Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut.Bradley Armour-Garbis Professor of Philosophy at the University of Albany, SUNY