Delegation is an ubiquitous social phenomenon linked to the growing differentiation of modern societies. Delegation is one of several different modes of organisation that exist to make collective action successful, but has been overlooked and under-researched.
Using a rational choice institutional analysis and principal agent models, this book brings literature on delegation to bureaucracy, electorate to legislature to government within representative democracy together with literature on new forms of delegation such as non-majoritarian institutions, to provide a more complete and synthetic analysis of delegation in political systems.
With a broad and comparative approach, this is an important volume for advanced students, researchers and professionals concerned with delegation in the areas of public policy, public administration and democratic theory.
Preface
Chapter 1. Delegation in Contemporary Democracies: introduction (Dietmar Braun and Fabrizio Gilardi
PART 1: THE STANDARD CHAIN OF DELEGATION
Chapter 2. The (Moral) Hazards of Parliamentary Democracy (Kaare Str?m, Wolfgang C. M?ller, Torbj?rn Bergman)
Chapter 3. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies: Smallness, Proximity and Shortcuts (Patrick Dumont and Fr?d?ric Varone)
Chapter 4. A Theory of Efficient Delegation (David Epstein and Sharyn OHalloran)
Chapter 5. A Delegation Theory for Explaining the Bureaucratization of Public Administrations (Victor Lapuente Gin?)
PART 2: THE NEXT STEPS OF DELEGATION: INDEPENDENT AGENCIES, INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
Chapter 6. Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe: Credibility, Political Uncertainty, and Diffusion (Fabrizio Gilardi)
Chapter 7. Delegation in the distributive policy arena: the case of research policy (Dietmar Braun)
Chapter 8.l£,