This book analyses whether determinism or indeterminism is compatible with moral obligation, right or wrong.This book addresses the following dilemma: If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. But it is morally obligatory, right, or wrong, for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. This dilemma can be evaded, because moral obligation is incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. Prof. Haji concludes by explaining that if no action is morally obligatory, right, or wrong, then our world would be morally impoverished.This book addresses the following dilemma: If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. But it is morally obligatory, right, or wrong, for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. This dilemma can be evaded, because moral obligation is incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. Prof. Haji concludes by explaining that if no action is morally obligatory, right, or wrong, then our world would be morally impoverished.This book addresses the following dilemma: if determinism is true, no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong, for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. This dilemma can be evaded, because moral obligation is incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. Prof. Haji concludes by explaining that if no action is morally obligatory, right, or wrong, then our world would be morally impoverished.Acknowledgements; 1. Introduction; Part I. Determinism and Deontic Morality: 2. Obligation and control; 3. Frankfurt-type cases and deontic control; 4. Control requirements of deontic anchors: some objections; 5. Determinism and deontic anchors; Part II. lă9