Epistemic Issues in Pragmatic Perspective [Hardcover]

Rescher has a wonderful talent for moving from common sense observations to profound philosophical conclusions in just a few clearly reasoned steps. Here that talent is in full display with an analysis of the various pragmatic mechanisms of rational guesswork, plausible conjecture, analogical reasoning, extrapolation, and inference by explanation that really make up what we rely on as knowledge, both scientifically and in our everyday lives.Nicholas Rescher began publishing on epistemology and pragmatism in 1964, and has long been?the leading philosopher?in the area. This book collects his recent essays?in the field, giving special attention to such nonstandard sources of information as rational?guesswork?and plausible supposition. It highlights Rescher's distinctive focus on the justification of epistemic standards by their utility in shaping our effective practices. Readers will come away with a?deeper understanding of?the?role of pragmatic factors in epistemic evaluation and?their compatibility with objectivity and realism.Epistemic Issues in Pragmatic Perspective is an excellent book. Rescher updates his clearest, articulate, and quite wonderful journey through the heart of pragmatic epistemology. In past works he has argued that truth as we usually understand it, is not a necessary condition for propositional knowledge about the external world. For the persuasive reasons he urges, there is always some real probability that any of our beliefs about the physical world will be rejected and replaced in the future. Accordingly, the attainment of truth is always, and only an Aspirational goal rather than a necessary condition for knowledge providing certainty. What the real world is at any given moment is what the human mind constructs and represents in its most useful pursuits of biological and evolutionary adaptation.In the end he notes that some of our beliefs will be correct descriptions of the world, but our inherent limitations as a species prevent us frló½