There is a lot that we don't know. That means that there are a lot of possibilities that are, epistemically speaking, open. For instance, we don't know whether it rained in Seattle yesterday. So, for us at least, there is an epistemic possibility where it rained in Seattle yesterday, and one where it did not. What are these epistemic possibilities? They do not match up with metaphysical possibilities - there are various cases where something is epistemically possible but not metaphysically possible, and vice versa. How do we understand the semantics of statements of epistemic modality? The ten new essays in this volume explore various answers to these questions, including those offered by contextualism, relativism, and expressivism.
1. Introduction: Epistemic Modals and Epistemic Modality,
Brian Weatherson and Andy Egan2. Possibilities for Representation and Credence: Two-Space-ism vs. One-Space-ism,
Frank Jackson3. The Nature of Epistemic Space,
David Chalmers4. Conditional Propositions and Conditional Assertions,
Robert Stalnaker5. Perspective in Taste Predicates and Epistemic Modals,
Jonathan Schaffer6. 'Might' Made Right,
Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies7. Perspectives on Possibilities: Contextualism, Relativism, or What?,
Kent Bach8. Epistemic Modals are Assessment-Sensitive,
John MacFarlane9. Nonfactualism about Epistemic Modals,
Seth Yalcin10. How Not to Theorize about the Language of Subjective Uncertainty,
Eric Swanson11. A Problem about Permission and Possibility,
Stephen Yablo Epistemic Modalityis a must read. --
Notre Dame Philosophical ReviewsAndy Eganis Associate Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University in New Brunswick. He grew up in Madison, Wisconsin. He received his BA from the University of Wisconsin at Madison, an MA from the University of ColorlÓ)