Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture?Epistemic Valueis a collection of previously unpublished articles on such issues by leading philosophers in the field. It will stimulate discussion of the nature of knowledge and of directions that might be taken by the theory of knowledge. The contributors are Jason Baehr, Michael Brady, Berit Brogaard, Michael DePaul, Pascal Engel, Catherine Elgin, Alvin Goldman, John Greco, Stephen Grimm, Ward Jones, Martin Kusch, Jonathan Kvanvig, Michael Lynch, Erik Olsson, Wayne Riggs and Matthew Weiner.
Introduction,Alan Millar, Adrian Haddock, and Duncan Pritchard Part One: The Value of Knowledge 1. Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge,Alvin I. Goldman,(Rutgers University), and Erik J. Olsson, (Lund University) 2. Is There a Value Problem?,Jason Baehr, (Loyola Marymount University) 3. Testimony and the Value of Knowledge,Martin Kusch, (University of Cambridge) 4. The Value of Understanding,Jonathan Kvanvig, (Baylor University) 5. Ugly Analyses and Value,Michael R. DePaul, (University of Notre Dame) 6. The Goods and the Motivation of Believing,Ward E. Jones, (Rhodes University) 7. Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge,Matthew Weiner, (University of Vermont) 8. Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value,Pascal Engel, (University of Geneva) 9. Luck, Knowledge, and Control,Wayne Riggs, (University of Oklahoma) Part Two: Truth and Epistemic Appraisal 10. The Value of Truth and the Truth of Values,Michael P. Lynch, (University of Connecticut) 11. Epistemic Normativity,StelÓ‚