Few concepts have been considered as essential to the theory of knowledge and rational belief as that of evidence. The simplest theory which accounts for this is evidentialism, the view that epistemic justification for belief--the kind of justification typically taken to be required for knowledge--is determined solely by considerations pertaining to one's evidence. In this ground-breaking book, leading epistemologists from across the spectrum challenge and refine evidentialism, sometimes suggesting that it needs to be expanded in quite surprising directions. Following this, the twin pillars of contemporary evidentialism--Earl Conee and Richard Feldman--respond to each essay. This engaging debate covers a vast number of issues, and will illuminate and inform.
Introduction,Trent Dougherty Part I. Evidentialism and Disagreement 1. Evidence and Agent-Centered Norms,Michael Huemer 2. The Rational Significance of Reflective Ascent,Jonathan Kvanvig 3. Evidentialism and the Paradox of Parity,Keith Lehrer Part II. Virtue Critiques: Evidence and Inquiry 4. From Internalist Evidentialism to Virtue Responsibilism,Guy Axtell 5. Evidentialism, Vice, and Virtue,Jason Baehr Part III. Evidentialism and Skepticism 6. Evidentialist Anti-skepticism,Matthias Steup 7. Evidentialism and the Great Pumpkin Objection,Michael Bergmann Part IV. Knowledge First 8. Questioning Evidentialism,Keith DeRose 9. Improbable Knowing,Timothy Williamson Part V. Internalism/Externalism 10. Evidentialism and Knowledge,John Greco 11. Evidentialism and Truth,Richard Fumerton Part VI. Evidence 12. Evidence,Richard Swinburne 13. Making it Evident: Evidence and Evidentness, Justification and Belief,Patrick Rysiew 14.l3(