Fate of Reason German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte [Paperback]

The Fate of Reasonis the first general history devoted to the period between Kant and Fichte, one of the most revolutionary and fertile in modern philosophy. The philosophers of this time broke with the two central tenets of the modem Cartesian tradition: the authority of reason and the primacy of epistemology. They also witnessed the decline of the Aufkldrung, the completion of Kant's philosophy, and the beginnings of post-Kantian idealism.

Thanks to Beiser we can newly appreciate the influence of Kant's critics on the development of his philosophy. Beiser brings the controversies, and the personalities who engaged in them, to life and tells a story that has uncanny parallels with the debates of the present.

This is a unique, original, and important work. It undertakes a project never before attempted in English, nor likely soon to be attempted again; nor is there, at least as far as I know, any comparable twentieth-century work in German. This is not, however, because everyone else has thought better of the idea; it can only be because anyone else who ever considered it has been daunted by the magnitude of the task involved. What Beiser has written is the history of German philosophy in the epoch of Kant, a history focused primarily on the issue of the authority of reason. There is a great unity to Beisers treatment: it presents a picture of a whole generation of philosophical activity in all its richness, greater fish as well as lesser ones included. [The account] is fascinating, because it has rarely been attempted at all and because this generation of German philosophy is the first such generation of professional, university-oriented philosophy in modern times. Thus, Beiser gives us a wonderful glimpse into the origin of our profession as such. The richness of the fabric, the detailed presentation of the views, makes [the movements treated] come alive.The story Beisers book tells is an absolutely crucial one for anyone who wants to understaló,