Are companies, churches, and states genuine agents? Or are they just collections of individual agents that give a misleading impression of unity? This question is important, since the answer dictates how we should go about explaining the behaviour of these entities and whether we should treat them as responsible and accountable in the manner of individuals.
Group Agencyoffers a new approach to that question and is relevant, therefore, in a range of fields from philosophy to law, politics, and the social sciences. Christian List and Philip Pettit take the line that there really are group or corporate agents, over and above the individual agents who compose them, and that a proper social science and a proper approach to law, morality, and politics have to take account of this fact. Unlike some earlier defences of group agency, their account is entirely unmysterious in character and, despite not being technically difficult, is grounded in cutting-edge work in social choice theory, economics, and philosophy.
Contents
Preface
Introduction
I: The Logical Possibility of Group Agents1. The Conditions of Agency
2. The aggregation of intentional attitudes
3. The structure of group agents
II: The Organizational Design of Group Agents4. The Epistemic Desideratum
5. The Incentive-Compatibility Desideratum
6. The Control Desideratum
III: The Normative Status of Group Agents7. Holding Group Agents Responsible
8. Personifying Group Agents
9. Identifying with Group Agents
References
Endnotes
...there is a great deal to learn from this book and it ought to be required reading for anyone interested in group agency and responsibility. --
The Philosophical Quarterly The book should be considered as one of the landmarks of contemporary research on collective intentionally, rational choice theory, and group agency. I can warmly recommend it to anlĂ