This book traces how Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher, during their respective years as Conservative Opposition Leaders (1965-70 and 1975-79), managed their Partys attempts to ensure a return to government, each after two electoral defeats. They did so in the context of an emergent New Conservatism, championed by the likes of Enoch Powell, Keith Joseph and Nigel Lawson, which betokened a long-term change from the post-war Butskellite settlement.
Against a national background of declining economic status, high inflation, debilitating public sector strikes and internal Conservative Party debates, particularly over industrial relations policy and monetarism, they adopted strikingly different approaches to policy-making in Opposition. The book illustrates how, paradoxically, Heaths technocratic over-prescription failed to save his eventual premiership, while Thatchers under-committed policy design failed to impede her leading a purposeful and transformative government i
n the 1980s.
Chapter 1: Introduction.- Chapter 2: The nature of Conservatism.- Chapter 3: Decline and Fall I.- Chapter 4: Getting used to being out of office.- Chapter 5: Reasons (or excuses?) for failure.- Chapter 6: The road to Selsdon.- Chapter 7: Decline and Fall II.- Chapter 8: Decline and Fall II.- Chapter 9: Keith Josephs Third Crusade.- Chapter 10: Internal warfare.- Chapter 11: The inflation nettle.- Chapter 12: The industrial relations nettle.- Chapter 13: Thatcher ideologue or pragmatist?.- Chapter 14: Conclusion Heath and Thatcher in Opposition.- Bibliography.- Index
The book can perhaps best be seen as a study of the adaptations of British Conservatism during the period seen by many as corresponding to the breakdown of the post-war settlement. &lC#