How We Act Causes, Reasons, and Intentions [Hardcover]

Talking about action comes easily to us. We quickly make distinctions between voluntary and non-voluntary actions; we think we can tell what intentions are; we are confident about evaluating reasons offered in rational justification of action. Berent En? provides a philosopher's sustained examination of these issues: he portrays action as belonging to the causal order of events in nature, a theory from which new and surprising accounts of intention and voluntary action emerge. Philosophers and cognitive scientists alike will findHow We Acta provocative and enlightening read.

Introduction
1. Volitions
2. Basic Actions
3. The Causal Theory Revisited
4. Deviance
5. A Causal Model of Deliberation
6. Intentions
7. Autonomy, the Will, and Freedom
References

...thorough and detailed...provides an excellent introduction to the field of action theory in general and a rigorous defense of the claim that volition can be accommodated into a naturalistic system. --The Review of Metaphysics

This carefully crafted work offers a systematic set of arguments for natural-cause accounts of human action. Enc displays an impressive knowledge of a wide range of relevant philosophical, psychological, and biological literature. This work could serve as an excellent reference for anyone wanting an overview of the perennial questions concerning human action. Highly recommended. --Choice

Berent En? was Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison until his death in January 2003.