Based on interviews with political decision-makers involved in post-Cold War case studies, this research reassesses the prevalent conclusion in the academic literature, according to which American public opinion has limited influence on military interventions, by including the level of commitment in the study of the decision-making process.Introduction PART I: THE INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC OPINION ON MILITARY INTERVENTIONS: CONCEPTS AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES 1. The Influence Of Public Opinion On Military Interventions: Theoretical Approaches And Their Limits 2. Including Considerations With Military Strategy To The Study Of The Influence Of Public Opinion PART II: PUBLIC OPINION AND THE INITIAL DECISION TO USE FORCE 3. Personal Preferences 4. The Limited Intervention In Rwanda 5. The Intervention In Bosnia 6. The Intervention In Haiti 7. The Intervention In Afghanistan In 2001 8. The Intervention In Iraq In 2003 PART II CONCLUSION PART III: CHANGING STRATEGY FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS: THE PRESIDENT'S ROOM FOR MANEUVER 9. The Iraq Surge 10. The Afghan Surge PART III CONCLUSION 11. Conclusion Annex: Conducting Interviews Bibliography Interviews
Drawing on a great many interviews with decision makers, the author makes one of the most persuasive cases to date for how public opinion - and anticipated public opinion - has constrained military interventions by American presidents. - Robert Y. Shapiro, Professor of Political Science, Columbia University, USA
Drawing broadly on the literature and enriched by extensive interviews, Dieck's work provides an important contribution to understanding the politics of US decisions to use military force. Some keen insights on the impact of public opinion and the scope and limits of recent American Presidents' domain of choice in making such fateful decisions. - Bruce W. Jentleson, Professor of Public Policy and Political Science, Duke University, USA
Helene Dieck has provided an insightful accl“ó