A self-contained 1996 account of the game theory and statistics used in modelling compliance with international agreements.International agreements, such as those governing arms control or the environment, virtually always require some degree of verification of information to establish compliance. Mathematical models of the verification process are built to ensure that it is efficient, effective and impartial. One such can be derived by applying methods from statistics and the theory of non-cooperative games. This book describes the theory, which is introduced in the context of specific real-world examples. The only prerequisites are simple calculus and statistics, so the book should be accessible to a broad range of scientists and non-scientists, in industrial, academic or governmental environments.International agreements, such as those governing arms control or the environment, virtually always require some degree of verification of information to establish compliance. Mathematical models of the verification process are built to ensure that it is efficient, effective and impartial. One such can be derived by applying methods from statistics and the theory of non-cooperative games. This book describes the theory, which is introduced in the context of specific real-world examples. The only prerequisites are simple calculus and statistics, so the book should be accessible to a broad range of scientists and non-scientists, in industrial, academic or governmental environments.International agreements, such as those governing arms control and the environment, virtually always require some degree of verification so that compliance can be established. To ensure that the verification process is regarded as efficient, effective and impartial, it is important to model it mathematically. One such model can be derived by applying methods from statistics and the theory of noncooperative games, developed in part by John Nash, who received a Nobel Prize in 1994 for his work. Thelă)