Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Volume XXIX [Paperback]

The essays in this volume explore various issues pertaining to human agency, such as the relationship between free will and causal determinism, and the nature and conditions of moral responsibility.

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• Builds on and extends some of the very best recent work in the field.
  
• Features lively and vigorous debate.
  
• Forges connections between abstract philosophical theorizing and applied work in neuroscience and even criminal law.

1. Can We Ever Be Really, Truly, Ultimately, Free?: Mark Bernstein (Purdue University).

2. On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility: Randolph Clark (University of Georgia).

3. Deliberation and Metaphysical Freedom: E. J. Coffman (University of Notre Dame) and Ted A. Warfield (University of Notre Dame).

4. Alienation, Autonomy, and the Self: Laura Waddell Ekstrom (College of William and Mary).

5. Neurobiology, Neuroimaging, and Free Will: Walter Glannon (University of Calgary).

6. Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question: Steward Goetz (Ursinus College).

7. Freedom, Obligation, and Responsibility: Prospects for a Unifying Theory: Ishtiyaque Haji (University of Calgary).

8. Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives: David P. Hunt (Whittier College).

9. Decisions, Intentions, and Free Will: Alfred R. Mele (Florida State University).

10. Where Frankfurt and Strawson Meet: Michael McKenna (Ithaca College).

11. Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of Situationism: Dana K. Nelkin (University of California, San Diego).

12. Freedom with a Human Face: Timothy O'Connor (Indiana University).

13. Defending Hard Incompatibililƒ#